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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether guarantees characterised by different degrees of
relationship lending (particularly referring to collateral and guarantees provided by Mutual Loan Guarantee
Institutions) are able to convey some entrepreneurial orientation (EO) dimensions from firms to banks.
Design/methodology/approach – Exploiting data from a survey of Austrian and Italian SMEs, the
empirical analysis is based on a sample of 328 small business firms. To test the signalling hypothesis, the
authors used logistic regressions to assess the explanatory power of EO dimensions on the presence of
several types of guarantees.
Findings – The analyses suggest that collateral cannot signal any EO dimension, even when controlling for
the strength of the bank – firm relationship. Furthermore, SMEs are able to mitigate their financial risk
through collateral only in a multiple bank – firm relationship. Lastly, innovativeness, competitive energy and
aggressiveness allow SMEs to obtain external guarantees (mutual guarantees, bank guarantees and public
guarantees, respectively), helpful in order to promote credit access.
Research limitations/implications – The mediation role of collateral and external guarantees on
EO – credit access relation should be analysed in future research. Since the role of guarantees can change
among different bank lending technologies, further studies should carefully consider lender’s characteristics.
Lastly, the use of loan data in respect of the firm data can help to better separate the effect of loan and firm
attributes on the collateral.
Practical implications – The study suggests how managers and entrepreneurs should manage the
financial risk through collateral in different situations (one–to–one and multiple bank – firm relationship).
Furthermore, depending on the level of innovativeness, competitive energy and aggressiveness, a firm should
request a specific type of external guarantees in order to increment the credit availability, to maximise the
possibility of success and to improve its performance.
Originality/value – To the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyse whether EO affects
the request for guarantees instead of credit access. This can be helpful especially when the banks involved in
the relation apply a transaction lending technology.
Keywords Performance, SME, Entrepreneurial orientation, Collateral, Mutual guarantees
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This paper aims at investigating whether guarantees characterised by different degrees of
relationship lending (particularly referring to collateral and guarantees provided by Mutual
Loan Guarantee Institutions, hereafter MLGIs) are able to convey some entrepreneurial
orientation (EO) dimensions from firms to banks.
The financial turmoil and the resulting macroeconomic slacks have implications for both
firms and the financial system. In particular, the recent financial crisis left important
consequences in the bank – firm relationship. From the banks’ side, the ability to select
good firms and projects became nowadays even more important to reduce losses. On the
other side, firms experienced tightening of credit access conditions, leading to a massive
credit crunch.
Among the prominent factors contributing to the tightening of credit access conditions in
Europe are the lack of investments and collateral availability, according to the European
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Central Bank’s periodic “Euro Area Bank Lending Survey”. In the years when the
world fell into the harsher stages of the crisis (2008–2009), roughly 40 per cent of banks
reported the collateral availability as an important factor contributing to tightening their
credit standards.
Literature analysing credit crunch effects focusses attempts on sorting out demand
(among others, see Ongena et al., 2011; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011) and supply effects
(Iyer et al., 2013; Jiménez et al., 2012). Investigation of the supply effects confirms that SMEs
now suffer more than before the crises, particularly referring to smaller, younger and riskier
firms (Kremp and Sevestre, 2013). Beyond firm characteristics, managers’ and
entrepreneurs’ qualities and competencies can play an important role (Moro et al., 2014).
Regarding the point, empirical studies investigated the relationship between EO and credit
access in order to improve firm performance, finding that EO presents a positive
relationship with credit availability (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Zampetakis et al., 2011;
Fatoki, 2012).
However, the effect of firm and entrepreneur characteristics on credit availability might
change depending on the bank lending technology type. To simplify and following Berger
and Udell (2006) rationales, lending technologies can be categorised in two types:
transaction lending that is based on quantitative data (the so-called “hard” information) and
relationship lending which is strongly based on personal knowledge and relations with the
firm (the so-called “soft” information).
Unlike firm performance, which can be assessed through financial statements, EO
dimensions are usually transmitted and perceived as “soft information”. We can conclude,
at least conceptually, that the EO dimensions could not have a direct influence on credit
access in the case of transaction lending. In this case, it can be important to elaborate an
alternative paradigm helpful to analyse EO relevance for the bank – firm relation from a
different standpoint.
An alternative point of view is to see the collateral as a “collector” of SMEs information.
Referring to the traditional adverse selection paradigm, pledging collateral may help
attenuate both adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besanko and Thakor, 1987;
Chan and Thakor, 1987) and moral hazard problems (Aghion and Bolton, 1992) acting as a
signal. The prediction, therefore, is that collateral works as a sorting device by which
low–risk borrowers pledge collateral whereas high–risk borrowers tend to be less
collateralised, especially when the firm characteristics are not observable.
Regarding other kinds of guarantees, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) find that loans
guaranteed by credit institutions or by the public sector are less risky (in terms of lower
firm’s probability of default). Bartoli et al. (2013) confirm those results on MLGIs
highlighting that mutually guaranteed firms are less likely to experience financial tension.
The signalling theory proved to be fruitful for addressing a number of research
questions in management (see Connelly et al., 2011), ranging from corporate governance,
entrepreneurship literature (Certo, 2003; Lester et al., 2006; Busenitz et al., 2005), capital
market decisions and human resource management. What remains in the shadow is the
management of collateral under the perspective of the borrower, i.e. decisions regarding
the choice of collateral type and the entrepreneurs’ factors affecting it.
The firm choice of how to signal to the lender its intrinsic characteristics requires further
research attention. Connelly et al. (2011) identified the incentives of signallers as an
interesting topic for further investigation, in particular regarding the extent to which signals
of the firm quality may help in predicting its performance. To the best of our knowledge,
there is a lack of investigation on the signalling power of collateral on EO, despite its
relevant managerial implications. We try to answer this first research question:






Furthermore, we focus on the signaller (the firm) – signal (the collateral) relation in order to
gauge the knowledge on how performance, entrepreneurial dimensions and competitive
energy can affect the access to mutual guarantees due to their level of relationship lending,
comparing the results with the signalling effect of other kinds of external guarantees – namely
public and bank guarantees. Bringing together entrepreneurial literature and the
borrower–lender literature we provide new insights on how firm’s characteristics affect
firm’s behaviour when selecting the most appropriate form of guarantee with the purpose of
signalling soft information. A second research question we try to answer in this paper is:
RQ2. How do EO and firm performance affect the availability of mutual guarantees?
To address the investigation in a wider perspective, a sample of 328 Austrian and Italian
SMEs was analysed. Logistic regressions are used to answer the research questions.
We found that the simple provision of collateral does not provide a signal of either
positive or negative performance and EO, while financial leverage affects positively
collateral, with a different magnitude if the bank – firm relationship is not exclusive.
Interestingly, each type of third-party guarantee is associated with different dimension:
innovative and low autonomy firms are affiliated to MLGIs, bank guarantees are associated
with competitive energy, and public–sector guarantees are positively affected by
aggressiveness. Furthermore, both mutual and bank guarantees are characterised by low
levels of subjective performance.
Our contribution is relevant for entrepreneurs and firm managers. The study suggests
how managers and entrepreneurs should manage the financial risk through collateral in the
different situations (one–to–one and multiple bank – firm not relationship). Furthermore,
depending on the level of innovativeness, competitive energy and aggressiveness, firms
should request of a specific type of external guarantees in order to maximise the possibility
of success, to increment the credit availability and to improve the performance.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the concept of EO and the
link with the credit access. Sections 3 and 4 develop the hypotheses for the collateral and the
guarantees provided by MLGIs, respectively. Section 5 describes the methodology and
Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses the results and concludes the paper.
2. EO and credit access
EO is among the most investigated management constructs of the last thirty years
(Gupta and Gupta, 2015), over which the literature has developed sound and rigorous
theoretical background (Basso et al., 2009).
In a wider perspective, we characterize EO as being an effective combination of five
dimensions (Hughes and Morgan, 2007; Kollmann et al., 2007; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996,
2001; Felício et al., 2012): risk–taking, innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive
aggressiveness and autonomy. Each dimension can be defined as follows.
Risk–taking behaviour can be identified as the propensity to commit large amounts of
resources to the appropriation of market opportunities, with the aim to secure high and
uncertain future returns (Huang et al., 2011); entrepreneurs denoted by risk–taking
behaviour tend to show a willingness to take on risky resources (like external financial
capital). Innovativeness measures the firm’s predisposition to introduce new products/
services or new processes and sustain experimentation requiring the commitment of
financial resources (Li et al., 2008). Proactiveness is the ability of management to act
anticipating the future demand for a product or service (Miller, 1983). Competitive
aggressiveness defines the intensity of firm’s efforts to outperform industry competitors
(Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Autonomy reflects the “independent spirit” (Lumpkin and
Dess, 1996), including the concept of free and independent action and decision–making




EO in the strict sense, it complements other factors describing the firm’s efforts to respond
to the actions of competitors (Felício et al., 2012).
With the purpose to explain the link between EO and performance, some studies tried to
test the moderator effect of credit availability, since entrepreneurial strategies require
considerable financial sources to be successful (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005). Zampetakis
et al. (2011) find a positive effect of EO on financial resources: the orientation towards action,
the active implementation of new ideas, the ability to anticipate opportunities to instigate
changes in current strategies and tactics and the ability to detect the future trend in the
markets increment the probability of obtaining additional financing resources. Fatoki (2012)
extends those results, considering SMEs from different sectors in South Africa.
On the supply side, when one participant of a financial transaction is not fully aware
either of characteristics of the other participant or of its behavioural intentions, rhetoric
related to EO should send positive signals to lenders (Moss et al., 2015). However, EO
transmission is difficult to predict, depending on a combination of different factors such as
the structure of the banking industry, the prevailing lending technology (in terms of
transaction lending vs relationship lending) and the availability of collateral. From the
banks’ side, the EO dimensions could not be captured and determinate an increment of
credit availability when the relationship with the firm is conducted in a transaction
lending framework. Since the transaction lending is mainly based on the firm’s hard
information, all the information related to the personal knowledge of the entrepreneur and
its business (soft information), including the EO dimensions, tend to have a marginal role
in the credit assessment.
In those terms, previous literature analysing the link EO–credit access (Wiklung and
Shepherd, 2005; Zampetakis et al., 2011; Fatoki, 2012), lacks in terms of splitting the
bank – firm relationship based on lending technologies. However, like Berger and Udell
(2006) highlighted, even using proxies to define the bank – firm relationship (like the type of
bank, i.e. cooperatives banks – in which the creditworthiness assessment is mainly based on
relationship lending – in comparison with the larger and globally significant banks – in
which the transaction lending is predominant), to separate the lending technologies
perfectly is a very challenging task.
Since EO can be transmitted like soft information from firms to banks, the collateral
pledging and the request of external guarantees can represent an alternative channel for a
bank to capture those entrepreneurs’ dimensions, in the light of the signalling theory. In the
next paragraph we describe the role of collateral in the signalling theory framework and we
develop the hypotheses about the effect of EO and performance on collateral; in the fourth
section we do the same in the case of the MLGIs’ guarantees, financial intermediaries
devoted to providing guarantees to SMEs.
3. Collateral, EO and firm performance
In frictionless markets, lenders possess all the relevant information for assessing borrowers.
Otherwise, in the presence of market imperfections, lenders tend to have a smaller set
of information on borrowers, especially when the borrowers are opaque as SMEs are
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015).
Any relation where two parties have different information (presence of asymmetric
information) depicts a good framework for the signalling theory (Spence, 2002), which is helpful
to explain the behaviour of the parties involved in the relation. In such a setting one party has
an information advantage (the sender) over the other party (the receiver). The sender faces
the choice of whether (and how) signal the relevant information – including his risk level – to
the receiver. The receiver has the problem of decoding such information in order to take some
management decisions. For a signal to be efficient, it should be both observable and costly






incentives to disseminate false signals. Spence (1973) first applied the signalling construct to
the labour market showing how high quality employees might distinguish themselves from
low quality ones through costly signalling of high quality education.
In the case of bank – firm relationship, the signalling theory is particularly suitable for at
least two reasons. First, firms’ decisions and actions deliver signals that the banks observe
in order to infer its status or the quality of its investment projects (i.e. financing decisions
and the timing when taping capital markets provides useful information). Second, since
financial contracts are dominated by uncertainty about future states of the world (i.e. the
quality of the borrower and evolution thereon along with the behaviour of borrowers),
the practice has developed incentive–compatible contracts for driving borrower behaviour
or facilitating monitoring activities, which are characterised by different costs. In order to
define such incentive–compatible contracts, the literature usually combines the theory on
collateral pledge with lender–borrower bargaining (i.e. the loan interest rate – see Bester,
1985; Comeig et al., 2014). In this framework collateral is able to signal significant
information on borrowers’ quality, especially in terms of risk.
However, the detection of the signal in terms of risk depends on the ability of the credit
institutions to observe firm characteristics (Berger et al., 2011; Meles et al., 2017).
When firm characteristics are not observable by banks, the presence of collateral is
negatively related to the firm’s risk, signalling good quality borrowers: lower the
borrowers’ probability of default, higher the incentive to pledge collateral, because the
chance to incur asset losses and to enforce collateral is remote; otherwise, bad borrowers,
due to the higher chance to face asset losses, tend to post a lower amount of collateral
(Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987). Bester (1985) argued
that, when collateral is offered to borrowers with different probabilities of default, riskier
firms choose banks that demand less collateral, given the higher probability of the
guarantee being enforced.
On the contrary, when firm information is observable, the relation between collateral and
borrower’s risk is positive since banks request collateral to cope with the moral hazard
problem of riskier borrowers (Boot et al., 1991; Chen, 2006). The more observable the risk of
borrowers is, the higher the collateral requested will be since a collateral induces more
borrower effort and reduces the incentives for strategic default (Bester, 1994). The empirical
evidence mainly supports those predictions (among others Jiménez and Saurina, 2004;
Brick and Palia, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009).
In the case of bank – firm relationship, the ability to observe borrowers’ information might
depend on the type of information (soft vs hard) and the strength of the bank – firm relationship.
Regarding the type of information, we can state that the soft one is constituted by all the
information non-transmissible in a numerical way like opinions, ideas, rumours, economic
projection, statement of managers plans and market commentary (Petersen, 2004). Since the
perception of EO dimensions by financial intermediaries is usually not collectable in a
numerical way, it has to be treated like soft information. For this reason EO cannot be easily
observed like, for example, the performance analysable through firm’s financial reports. Soft
information becomes more observable when the bank – firm relationship is strong. The
strength of the bank – firm relationship can be proxyed by using the length of the relation
(Berger and Udell, 1995; Machauer and Weber, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998;
Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2011), the
number of lenders (Ono and Uesugi, 2009), the presence of a main bank (Machauer and
Weber, 1998; Degryse and van Cayseele, 2000; Elsas and Krahnen, 2002), the physical
and organisational distance between the firm and the lender (Berger et al., 2011; Inderst and
Mueller, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009) and trust (Moro et al., 2012). The selection of the
appropriate measures of the bank – firm relationship strength mainly depends on the level




the strength of bank – firm relationship, since it is the unique measure applicable when only
firm data are available.
When the strength of the bank – firm relationship is weak (as in multiple relationship
case), information, including EO, tends to be not observable. In this framework,
following Berger et al. (2011) and Meles et al. (2017), less risky borrowers are driven
to offer collateral in order to signal their quality. On those bases we can formulate our
first hypothesis:
H1. In the absence of an exclusive bank – firm relationship, EO dimensions (innovativeness,
autonomy, risk–taking, proactiveness and competitive aggressiveness) positively
influence the provision of collateral.
In the presence of borrowers with observable characteristics, banks are likely to request
collateral to low quality firms, in order to compensate the (known) high – risk occurred
(Meles et al., 2017). On the contrary, for the (known) riskless firms, banks do not feel the need
to demand a higher level of collateral. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2. In the presence of an exclusive bank – firm relationship, EO dimensions
(innovativeness, autonomy, risk–taking, proactiveness, competitive aggressiveness)
negatively influence the provision of collateral.
Regarding hard information, empirical evidence demonstrates that the large part of “hard”
risk measures is positively related to the collateral. For example, age is negatively related
with the presence of collateral (Leeth and Scott, 1989), while doubtful loans ( Jiménez
and Saurina, 2004), overdrafts (Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014), financial leverage (Brick and
Palia, 2007) and default events (Brick and Palia, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2011)
positively affect the presence of collateral. Inderst and Mueller (2007) predict that observable
higher–risk borrowers pledge more collateral, implying that highly collateralised loans have
higher ex–post default likelihood.
Corporates default are often preceded by deterioration in firm’s economic and financial
ratios, such as turnover, liquidity ratios, leverage, coverage ratios and profitability, although
with a different magnitude in their predictive power (Muscettola and Pietrovito, 2012).
At least, when borrowers’ characteristics are observable, high default likelihood is
associated with deteriorating financial performance and implies high collateral requirements:
H3. Performance negatively influences the presence of collateral.
4. Mutual guarantees, EO and firm performance
While there is a vast body of research on collateral and its implications for the bank – firm
relationship, relatively less investigation has spurred on the ground of guarantee
schemes. Nevertheless, such schemes deserve attention given their unique features and the
promising insights that they can bring into the debate on lending relations, especially for
small business lending.
In general, credit guarantee schemes can emerge for the purpose of overcoming
information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender, diversifying risk and
exploiting regulatory arbitrages (Honohan, 2010). Specifically, partial credit guarantee
schemes are particularly valuable for banks supporting SMEs, more than other contractual
characteristics like interest rates or other regulatory subsidies (Beck et al., 2008).
Among them, MLGIs are associations of independent firms (normally, small businesses),
with or without government support, whose specific function is providing guarantees to
loans issued to their members, who are involved in the management of the association.
Guaranteed SMEs must take part in this mutual scheme by signing equity and paying a fee






Despite some concerns on this kind of external guarantees, in particular relating to the
public intervention (Camino and Cardone, 1999; Honohan, 2010; Columba et al., 2010), it is
highlighted that MLGIs guarantees are helpful for SMEs.
From an economic point of view, MLGIs intervention not only limits credit rationing
(Columba et al., 2010), but also implies lower credit costs (Zecchini and Ventura, 2009;
Cowling, 2010).
Regarding the MLGIs’ portfolio quality, Bartoli et al. (2013) found that MLGI guaranteed
firms are less likely to experience financial tension and Columba et al. (2010) showed that
small firms affiliated with MLGIs signal good creditworthiness since they present lower
interest rates with respect to other firms.
Even though those findings could suggest a positive relation between firms guaranteed
by MLGI’s and their performance, this relation deserves further investigation.
First, in practice firm performance could not affect the provision of mutual guarantees,
since MLGIs are not able to measure it (especially financial performance) on a significant
part of their portfolio. In fact, micro and small firms that are not obliged to draw up financial
reporting or subject to a limited external disclosure reppresent a large part of their portfolio.
For this reason, MLGIs usually based the SMES credit assessment on soft information,
exploiting their territorial proximity with firms.
Second, it was empirically demonstrated that mutually guaranteed firms are riskier
borrowers with poor performance, when public-sector contribution result in MLGIs.
According to Columba et al. (2010), when the public sector gives a partial contribution to
MLGIs (like in Italy), the screening activity from MLGIs became less strict and SMEs
affiliated show lower firm performance as compared with non-affiliated ones.
Lastly, and most important, SMEs requesting mutual guarantees are usually firms that
were previously rejected or discouraged by banks due to their poor performance (Gama and
Duarte, 2017). In practice, SMEs request mutual guarantees when their financial
performance is not sufficient for being financed by banking firms. MLGIs find themselves
having to select the companies to be guaranteed among those with a lower performance.
Those evidences lead us to formulate our fourth hypothesis:
H4. Performance negatively influences the presence of mutual guarantees.
What actually differentiates MLGIs from the other kinds of financial intermediaries is that they
base their assessment of the affiliated firms on the peculiar knowledge of business features and
specific traits of the entrepreneur, rather than exploiting a pure performance assessment.
As associations between small businesses, MLGs can be regarded as the locus where
associated firms meet and interact, spurring a network of relations. A unique network of
relations possessed by individuals or social units allows them to access valuable resources
and knowledge (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). Such a form of
proximity develops social capital, defined by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) as the overall
resources embedded in the wide network of relations that individuals and economic actors
possess. From a firm’s perspective, two strictly related dimensions are connected to the
social capital. The first is its role as a conduit for acquiring external knowledge and
resources through social connections (Manev et al., 2005). The second is related to the
managerial function of directing social capital to acquire valuable resources and their
orchestration for the purpose of supporting firm’s actions (Sirmon et al., 2011).
On a wider perspective, networks of relations might allow an inter-unit exchange of
resources, an inter-firm learning and lead to product innovation (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
The inter-firm exchange of knowledge and information allows for an inter-firm learning
about peer’s business activities, strengths, weaknesses and the unique resources they are
endowed with. In that, MLGIs represent an interesting case for investigating how




between the firms involved in the relation. Arguably, network relations within local
communities and within sectors should facilitate such exchange of knowledge, especially in
the case of MLGIs that are established on a sector or industry level.
Since Miao et al. (2017) accounted for a positive association between EO and social
capital, and in the light of the evidence described above, we can postulate that mutually
guaranteed firms are entrepreneurially oriented. At the same time, social connections allow
MLGIs to possess unique information on the associates and find themselves in a better
position to certify and signal to lenders the quality of the firms they support, more than a
bank or public guarantee can do.
Therefore, we can predict a significant relation between EO and access to mutual
guarantees. Positive EO attributes of a firm suggest entrepreneur proactivity also on the
availability of external guarantees, due to their importance in the obtainment of banks
loans. The following hypothesis can be formulated:
H5. EO dimensions (innovativeness, autonomy, risk-taking, proactiveness and
competitive aggressiveness) positively influence the presence of mutual guarantees.
5. Methodology
5.1 Data and sample
The data derive from the European Interreg Italia–Austria research project for a sample of
Italian and Austrian firms. Out of the 3,950 questionnaires submitted within a one-year
period (2013), we received 328 answers (response rate around 8 per cent), minimising the
lack of technical comprehension, errors, and missing data. SMEs are defined according to
European Recommendation 2003/361/EC and include firms of less than 250 employees,
with a turnover of at most €50 m or total assets of at most €43 m. Firms in the sample
were selected within North-East Italy and South Austria considering both activity
(using ATECO codes) and province population. The sample gives a general representation
of the Italian and Austrian economies, thanks to the heterogeneity of firms in terms of
legal status and sectors.
5.2 The measurement model
For each firm, EO dimensions are considered and measured by means of the following items
based on a Likert scale: risk taking (RISK, six items taken from Hornsby et al., 2002; Morgan
and Strong, 2003; Acedo and Jones, 2007), Innovativeness (INNOV, four items taken from
Calantone et al., 2002), Proactiveness (PROAC, ten items taken from Acedo and Jones, 2007;
Hult and Ketchen, 2001; Morgan and Strong, 2003), Competitive aggressiveness (AGRESS,
six items taken from Lumpkin and Dess, 2001), Autonomy (AUTON, nine items taken from
Engel, 1970; Hornsby et al., 2002; and Spreitzer, 1995).
First of all, by means of factorial analysis, we reduced the items of each construct to a
unique reference. In addition, we performed a scale reliability analysis to validate our EO
variables. Table I reports the results for Cronbach’s α and the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin statistic.
The results confirm the validity of our scales and suggest that some items should be
dropped in order to obtain more reliable scales. In particular, items 5 and 6 can be dropped
from the risk scale, items 1 and 5 can be removed from the aggressiveness scale and items
1 and 6 can be excluded from the autonomy scale. Some other items were dropped from the
scales after carrying out the exploratory factor analysis.
The results of the factor analysis are given in Table II. Finally, 26 items were considered
in the analysis of constructs. The global Cronbach’s α is acceptable (0.84). The results of the
estimation of the five latent dimensions show that the cumulative proportion of
variance included in the factors is 47.5 per cent. A similar result can be obtained using the






components is 57.7 per cent. The factor loadings were obtained considering the varimax
rotation and the relative scores were used in the following analyses. The threshold for the
factor loadings was fixed at 0.4 (with the exception of the coefficient for the first item of
risk scale). In general, the estimation results are coherent with the theoretical scale
specification. The reliability of the factor analysis can be evaluated considering the standard
measures. The RMSR value is 0.040 and its corrected value is 0.050. The Tucker-Lewis
Index (TLI) of factor reliability is 0.832 and the RMSEA value is 0.073. The RMSR and TLI
values are acceptable, while the RMSEA value is slightly larger than the suggested limit.
We also performed a scale reliability analysis to validate the performance multiple items
scale. The analysis of Cronbach’s α (0.897) and of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (0.882) show that the
scale can be considered reliable. However, reliability can be improved by dropping the third
item on the scale, but the gain is irrelevant (α¼ 0.903). The results of the factor analysis
confirmed the unidimensionality of the scale and the results of the data reduction method can
be considered reliable. The RMSR value is 0.07 and its corrected value is 0.09. The TLI of factor
reliability is 0.845. The RMSEA value is 0.164, which is somewhat larger than the suggested
limit (0.05). Nevertheless, the proportion of “explained” total variance is 0.54.
5.3 Research model
The research model is as follows:
P G ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ f firm generic variables; financial variables andð performance;
loan variables; relationship variables;Entrepreneurial orientation variablesÞ
(1)
In accordance with Ono and Uesugi (2009), the dichotomous variable (G) is equal to one when
the line granted by the main bank is guaranteed, zero otherwise. The research model is run
using four different types of guarantees: collateral (G¼GUA), mutual guarantee (G¼MG),
bank guarantee (G¼BG) and public-sector guarantee (G¼PG). GUA is used on full sample
(MODEL 1) to test the third hypothesis, on a sub-sample of: exclusive bank – firm relationships
Construct Total Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 Item 7 Item 8 Item 9 Item 10
INNOV
α 0.873 0.837 0.854 0.817 0.841 – – – – – –
KMO 0.780 0.815 0.805 0.753 0.758 – – – – – –
RISK
α 0.457 0.318 0.339 0.343 0.405 0.534 0.495 – – – –
KMO 0.573 0.559 0.571 0.606 0.539 0.593 0.659 – – – –
PROAC
α 0.877 0.868 0.865 0.862 0.869 0.860 0.871 0.862 0.865 0.862 0.865
KMO 0.896 0.898 0.941 0.900 0.896 0.903 0.882 0.881 0.868 0.922 0.876
AGGRESS
α 0.701 0.711 0.581 0.590 0.622 0.747 0.654 – – – –
KMO 0.661 0.618 0.622 0.619 0.741 0.479 0.804 – – – –
AUTON
α 0.738 0.752 0.699 0.690 0.711 0.681 0.777 0.700 0.714 0.703 –
KMO 0.805 0.868 0.869 0.742 0.670 0.865 0.746 0.778 0.911 0.826 –
Note: In italic the values of the Cronbach’s a are larger than the general scale index (suggesting the







(MODEL 2); and multiple bank – firm relationships (MODEL 3), in order to test the first and
second hypothesis, respectively. MG is used on the full samples (MODEL 4) in order to test the
fourth and fifth hypotheses. Finally BG and PG are used on the full samples (MODEL 5 and 6,
respectively) in order to compare the results with the case of mutual guarantees.
5.4 Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables can be classified into five groups: firm generic variables, financial
variables and performance, loan variables, relationship variables and managerial variables.
Except for performance and managerial variables, the other variables are taken by the
consolidated literature on collateral. Regarding the performance, since the presence of
collateral is affected by the default events (Brick and Palia, 2007; Jiménez et al., 2009; Berger
et al., 2011), we use some performance indicators, which can impact on the probability of
default (Altman, 1968). Regarding managerial variables, assuming that those aspects can
affect credit and guarantees access, we test their significance through the models.
Firm generic variables (all variables are taken from Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014).
The firm’s generic information refers to its geographical location (GEO, Italy or
Austria), sector (SEC, services, commercial or industrial sectors), size (SIZE, the number of



























SS loadings 3.503 3.008 2.754 2.042 1.052
Variance proportion 0.135 0.116 0.106 0.079 0.041
Cumulative variance proportion 0.135 0.250 0.356 0.435 0.475
Notes: The RMSR value is 0.040 and its corrected value is 0.050. The Tucker Lewis Index of factor reliability
is 0.832 and the RMSEA values is 0.073. aThe loadings values are reported if larger than 0.400. For the risk
construct the first loading is lower than the threshold, but it is reported because it represents the larger value;
bthe only item giving an ambiguous result if the fourth of the aggressiveness scale, notwithstanding the









full-time employees), age (FIRM_AGE) and the presence of a sole owner (SOLOWNER, a
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a sole owner and zero otherwise).
Financial variables and performance. The first financial variable is the ratio between the
amount of equity and to the total funding sources (CAP, taken from Brick and Palia, 2007),
the presence of outstanding receivables (OUT, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm
has outstanding receivables and zero otherwise, used to measure the firm’s default attitude,
see Inderst and Mueller, 2007). Following Koe (2013) approach, we examined performance
(PERF, eight items) by means of the results of a factor analysis in terms of sales growth,
employee growth, market share growth, economic margins growth, return on equity (or the
ratio of net income against equity capital), return on investment (or the ratio of operating
profits against capital invested), return on sales (or the ratio of operating profits against
sales) and earnings retention.
Loan variables. Loan variables comprise the characteristics of bank debt. Following prior
research, we used the loan cost (LOAN_COST, taken from Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014) and
loan duration. To overcome the unavailability of the loan credit files for the firms, instead of
the time variable of loan duration (Yaldiz Hanedar et al., 2014), we used two dummy
variables expressing the presence of short-term debt (SHORT_DEBT) and long-term debt
(LONG_DEBT).
Relationship variables. We measured the relationship variable as the number of financial
intermediaries that provide cash loans (LEND, taken form Ono and Uesugi, 2009).
Managerial variables. Risk taking (RISK), Innovativeness (INNOV), Proactiveness
(PROAC), Competitive aggressiveness (AGRESS), Autonomy (AUTON). Following Felício
et al. (2012), we introduced a variable measuring Competitive energy (COMP_EN, seven items).
Lastly, the following variables are taken accordingly to Herath (2007): the entrepreneurial
strategies (STRAT, seven items), the presence of economic and financial control on financial
sources (FIN, dummy variable that equals one if the firm control systematically the correct use
of financial sources and zero otherwise), the use of forecasting techniques (BDG, scored
from one to seven) and the use of cost control techniques (COST_CONTROL, scored from one
to seven).
More information regarding the variables is reported in Table III.
5.5 Statistical tool
Using a stepwise methodology for each model, we selected the best explanatory variables
among the set of variables described above. In order to check the validity of the estimated
models, we also adopted a bootstrap approach. The number of replication is fixed at 1,000.
The results of the generalised linear model estimation and the bootstrap results are reported
in the next section. In order to generate the bootstrap replicates of the logit model
parameters’ estimates, we used the boot command in R boot library. In particular, the results
were obtained adopting the non–parametric ordinary resampling approach with equal
probabilities of inclusion. The parameters’ medians are reported in Tables V and VI along
with the limits of the 95% confidence interval. The median is used instead of the mean in
order to avoid the presence of some very large outliers. In general, the results of the
bootstrap estimation were very similar to those of the standard logit models.
6. Results
Excluding data with missing variables and outliers, the final sample is composed of 181
Italian firms and 91 Austrian firms. The summary statistics are given in Table IV, and
Table V provides the correlation matrix.
We ran the logit model to test our hypotheses. To explore the issue of collinearity in the




(Fox and Monette, 1992). These measures identify inflation as the size of the confidence
intervals for the coefficients due to correlation in the data.
For the selected models (best Akaike information criterion values), the analysis of the
VIF measures suggests that in MODEL 4 two variables (competitive energy and strategy)
are strictly related. We ultimately excluded the competitive energy variable from the model
specification. The VIF values for the final models’ specification are shown in Table VI.
The empirical results are reported in Tables VII and VIII. Table VII presents the
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables for the logit model that are used to test
H1–H3, while Table VIII presents the explanatory variables for the logit model specification
which can be used to test H4 and H5. In order to evaluate the model goodness of fit we
adopted the predictive capability index. For all the considered models, this measure resulted
in acceptable values.
Looking at the determinants of collateral, our results show different patterns throughout
the various models we tested (MODEL 1, MODEL 2 and MODEL 3). In all the three models a
negative association between age (FIRM_AGE) and collateral emerges, implying that young
Variable Definition
Dependent variables
GUA Dummy variable indicating whether collateral has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
MG Dummy variable indicating whether a mutual guarantee has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
BG Dummy variable indicating whether a bank guarantee has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
PG Dummy variable indicating whether a public guarantee has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
Firm generic variables
GEO Dummy variable indicating whether the firm is Italian (¼ 1) or Austrian (¼ 0)
SEC Three sector dummies.
SIZE Total number of full–time employees
FIRM_AGE Age of the firm (in years)
SOLOWNER Dummy variable indicating whether the firm is owned by a sole owner (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
Financial variables and performance
CAP Equity per source of the firm (¼ equity/(equity + financial debt))
OUT Dummy variable indicating whether the firm has outstanding receivables (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
PERF Factorial measure of subjective performance
Loan variables
LOAN_COST Cost of financial sources [¼ interest expenses/bank debt]
SHORT_DEBT Dummy variable indicating whether short–term debt bank has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
LONG_DEBT Dummy variable indicating whether long–term debt bank has been used (¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
Relationship variables
LEND Number of bank or other financial intermediaries that finance the firm
Entrepreneurial Orientation variables
RISK Factorial measure of risk taking
IINNOV Factorial measure of innovativeness
PROAC Factorial measure of proactiveness
AGRESS Factorial measure of competitive aggressiveness
AUTON Factorial measure of autonomy
COMP_EN Factorial measure of competitive energy
FIN Dummy variable indicating whether the firm systematically controls its financial sources
(¼ 1) or not (¼ 0)
BDG Score (1 to 7) to measure the firm’s attitude to using forecasting techniques
STRAT Score (1 to 7) to measure the firm’s attitude to formulating strategies








firms are more probable to pledge collateral. In MODEL 1 and 3, the leverage ratio (CAP) is
significantly and negatively related with collateral, although with different magnitude
( β¼−0.978 in the first model and β¼−1.476 in the third model). Under an exclusive
bank – firm relation, it is the loan pricing (LOAN_COST) to emerge as a significant variable,
entering the relation with a positive sign (β¼ 23.541) and showing that firms characterised
by higher interest rates are more probable to pledge collateral. The other loan variables
(namely, LONG_DEBT and SHORT_DEBT) are significant only in the first model (β¼ 0.602
and 0.908, respectively). Finally, in a multiple bank – firm relationship framework, the cost
control (COST_CONTROL) is significant and enters the relation with collateral with a
negative sign ( β¼−0.174).
Turning to external guarantees (MODEL 4, MODEL 5, MODEL 6), we observe that
young and small firms are more likely to affiliate to MLGIs: size (SIZE) and age
(FIRM_AGE) are both weakly significant and negatively related with MLGIs (MODEL 4)
with a β that equals −0.010 and −0.017, respectively. Bank guarantees (MODEL 5) are
significantly and negatively associated with the presence of a unique firm owner
(SOLOWN), with a coefficient equal to −0.861: the more concentrated the ownership, the less
likely is the firm to resort to bank guarantees. Both MLGIs and bank guarantees are
negatively associated with performance ( β¼−0.074 and −0.041, respectively).
The presence of long debt (LONG_DEBT) and the number of bank relationships (LEND)
are positively and significantly associated with all external guarantees (MLGIs, bank and
public guarantees). Loan pricing (LOAN_COST) has an opposite behaviour in MLGIs and
bank guarantees: it is positively associated with MLGIs ( β¼ 14.156) while it is negatively
associated with bank guarantees ( β¼−12.186).
Finally, it is interesting to note the impact of EO dimensions which affects, to some
extent, only MLGIs and public guarantees (MODEL 6). More precisely, MLGIs are positively
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std
GUA 0, 1 272 0.619 0.486
MG 0, 1 272 0.210 0.408
BG 0, 1 272 0.186 0.413
PG 0, 1 272 0.217 0.413
GEO 0, 1 272 0.689 0.464
SIZE Quantity 272 25.250 68.168
FIRM_AGE Years 272 25.740 26.093
SOLOWNER 0, 1 272 0.494 0.501
CAP Ratio 272 0.521 0.363
OUT 0, 1 272 0.442 0.497
PERF Quantity 272 34.720 8.202
LOAN_COST Ratio 272 0.043 0.034
SHORT_DEBT 0, 1 272 0.613 0.488
LONG_DEBT 0, 1 272 0.546 0.499
LEND Quantity 272 2.866 2.779
RISK Quantity 272 8.484 2.938
INNOV Quantity 272 9.4720 5.012
PROAC Quantity 272 29.500 7.102
AGGRESS Quantity 272 9.778 5.070
AUTON Quantity 272 18.84 4.946
COMP_EN Quantity 272 4.485 1.676
STRAT Quantity 272 4.572 1.553
FIN 0, 1 272 0.606 0.491
BDG Scaled (1, 7) 272 4.444 2.222

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































associated with innovativeness (INNOV) ( β¼ 0.099) and negatively associated with
autonomy (AUTON) ( β¼−0.123). Public guarantees, in turn, are positively associated with
aggressiveness (AGGRESS) ( β¼ 0.120). By contrast there is no significant impact of any of
the EO dimensions on bank guarantees, which are only positively related to competitive
energy (COMP_EN) ( β¼ 0.311).
7. Discussion and conclusions
7.1 Collateral and financial risk management
Results show that any good or bad performance does not characterize firms pledging
collateral; neither EO dimensions manifest any correlation with the presence of
collateralised firm. Thus, H1–H3 regarding the effect of EO and performance
on collateral are not confirmed. At a first glance, these results suggest that information
asymmetries persist as a challenging issue and collateral proves to be inefficient as a sorting
device of firm’s quality.
However, the firm characteristic effects on collateral can provide important implication
regarding the management of financial risk. In fact, the only firm specific variable affecting
collateral is the ratio of shareholder equity issued by the firm to the total financing sources
(capitalisation ratio – CAP), according to Brick and Palia (2007). Rather than acting as a
signalling mechanism, collateral serves as a substitute of firm capitalisation level in order to
mitigate the financial risk suffered by third parties lenders (i.e. banks). Introducing the
strength of the bank – firm relationship in the analysis, we are able to complete the picture
adding significant evidence. Splitting our sample into multiple–lender firms and firms
holding an exclusive bank – firm relationship, we observe that in the first case the
information asymmetry issue becomes more severe, reinforcing the “substitution effect”
between collateral and leverage. In fact the capitalisation ratio is significant at 1 per cent
level with a coefficient of −1.476 (MODEL 3) against a significance level of 5 per cent with a
coefficient of −0.978 for the base case (MODEL 1). By contrast, when it comes to firms with
exclusive bank relations (MODEL 2), firms’ characteristics become observable. In this
framework, finding a positive relationship between loan pricing (LOAN_COST) and
collateral, banks are able to discern low-risk and high-risk firms so that the latter
are charged higher interest rates. In fact, according to Hainz et al. (2013) and
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6






LOAN_COST 1.033 1.064 1.260
LONG_DEBT 1.245 1.220 1.144 1.032
SHORT_DEBT 1.235





COST_CONTROL 1.177 1.116 1.234





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Yaldiz Hanedar et al. (2014), positive relation between loan’s spread and collateralised loans
support the observed risk hypotheses investigated in the literature.
The association between collateral and capitalisation ratio elicit few implications on the
relations between capital structure, firm’s assets and investment policies. Corporate finance
literature counts collateral among the determinants of the capital structure. In line with
Myers and Majluf (1984), firms holding collateralizable assets would optimally choose
higher debt ratios, especially when outside investors suffer from information gaps. In fact,
differently from the case of multiple bank – firm relationships (higher level of information
asymmetry), in which firms compensate financial fragility by pledging collateral, in an
exclusive bank – firm relationship the financial risk perceived by credit institutions cannot
be mitigated using collateral. In this case, entrepreneurs should operate with an adequate
equity dotation. As a consequence, a more versatile management of financial risk should
lead managers to operate with a high number of banks.
7.2 EO, credit access and performance: the contribution of MLGIs and other
external guarantees
In this sub-section, we move to discuss the evidence on external guarantees, which represent
the novel part of the present work.
First, with respect to the short-term debt, the long-term debt is more difficult to monitor
(Rajan and Winton, 1995), justifying the positive relation between LONG_DEBT and
collateral. Furthermore, the positive correlation between the number of lenders and the
presence of external guarantees complete the evidence of Ono and Uesugi (2009) and find
support in the work of Moro et al. (2012): a closer relationship between a borrower and a
lender reduces the use of external guarantees and does not affect the presence of collateral.
On the contrary, a weak bank – firm relationship is reinforced by turning to mutual, bank,
and public–sector guarantees, rather than a collateral pledge.
Regarding the hypotheses formulation, results demonstrate an inverse relation between
subjective performance (PERF) and the access to guarantees, particularly referring to bank
guarantees (MODEL 5) and mutual guarantees (MODEL 4), confirming the HP4. In the case
of mutual guarantees, the inverse relationship between the quality of the firm and
the presence of guarantee is confirmed by looking at the sign and the significance of
outstanding receivables (OUT) and loan pricing (LOAN_COST), with a coefficient of 0.902
(5 per cent significance level) and 14.156 (5 per cent significance level), respectively. But this
evidence does not mean an absence of screening filter from MLGIs and banks that imply an
adverse selection made by those financial intermediaries. In fact, both MLGIs and banks
imply credit-scoring system to access their potential firm guaranteed. This is rather because
third party guaranteed loans may attract firms in which the financing requests were
previously rejected or discouraged by lenders (Gama and Duarte, 2017).
Comparing mutual guarantees with other external guarantees, we observe important
results: mutual guarantee is positively associated with innovativeness (INNOV), bank
guarantees with competitive energy (EN_COM) and public guarantees with aggressiveness
(AGGRESS). Referring to mutual guarantees, H5 is partially confirmed (MODEL 4): the
mutual guarantees are negatively related to autonomy (AUTON) and positively related to
innovativeness (INNOV). The negative relationship between autonomy and the presence of
mutual guarantees appears counterintuitive. However, a firm with scarce autonomy tends to
suffer financially (Covin et al., 2006). The poor availability of finance is the most significant
obstacle to the launching of new businesses (Van Auken, 1999) and to the start-up process
(Holtz–Eakin et al., 1994). Firms characterised by a lack of financing sources are more likely
to request mutual guarantees. Thus, mutual guarantee affiliated firms tend to manifest low
autonomy and are more likely to experience credit rationing. This is coherent with the






level and negatively related with MLGIs. Therefore, young and small firms are the ones that
are most prone to make recourse to MLGIs, highlighting MLGIs as a viable mechanism for
sorting out firms with specific characteristics. Those results do not support the
adverse selection hypothesis that some authors advocates as a potential drawback of
MLGIs intervention. Rather, since assessing young, small and innovative firms requires
information that is not easily available from financial reports or credit filings by banks,
MLGIs have an important role in supporting those firms, exploiting their proximity to them.
Past literature shows a positive relation between credit access and performance in a
sense that financing sources availability influences the future performance positively
(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005; Zampetakis et al., 2011). However, whether the historical
(subjective and financial) performance is negative, firm tends to front high difficulties to
maintain or reach an additional amount of credit availability, especially in the current
macroeconomic scenario. And this is true in particular in scenarios characterised by less
ability to monitor borrowers by banks and a higher level of information asymmetries
(high level of uncertainty). External guarantees became an important way to overcome this
impasse and establish a virtuous cycle: firm characterised by scarce performance and a
good level of innovativeness, aggressiveness and competitive energy in a scenario with a
high level of uncertainty, can refer to external guarantees to maintain or increment the
availability of financing sources and improve their performance.
Entrepreneurs and managers could increment the credit availability and firm
performance as a whole, acting on their EO specificities and asking for a specific kind of
external guarantee. The higher is the EO and competitive attitudes, the greater is the chance
to rely on a large set of external guarantees. This is particularly true for innovative firms
due to the lack of track records, the difficulties in reaching break even in the early stage of
their lives, the high level of risk, the difficulty in accessing their creditworthiness and the
lack of guarantees (see, for instance, Gualandri and Venturelli, 2008). Mutual guarantees
can be the way to favour the availability of additional sources to develop the business for
those firms.
7.3 Implications and future research
The present paper highlighted that MLGIs and bank guarantees act as viable signalling
mechanisms. Signals that they produce are observable and costly and, hence, not easily
replicable. The screenings that MLGIs do as guarantors add to the creditworthiness
valuation performed by the lending bank: given that they are based on the knowledge
of the firm receiving the loan, they are credible. Supposedly, it is however costly for the
low-quality firms to build up the endowment of social capital that MLGIs allow to develop or
to gain a bank commitment to secure a loan. Special relations that are developed among
associated firms allow MLGIS to gain peculiar knowledge of business features and specific
traits of entrepreneurs. Inter-firm exchange of knowledge and information allow learning
about peer’s business activities, strengths, weaknesses and the unique resources they are
endowed with.
Overall, our results suggest that bank – firm relationship is not just an exogenous
attribute of the firm’s approach to credit markets. Rather, firms, at least to some extent, can
manage their relations with credit institutions depending on a combination of a variety of
factors which can be related to the attitudes of the entrepreneur (i.e. in terms of EO), growth
prospects and opportunities, asset composition and investment policies. In such framework,
different types of guarantees can be seen as tools for efficiently managing the bank – firm
relationship. Therefore, for firms operating in industries characterised by low levels of
innovation or exhibiting at most short–term financial needs, multiple bank – firm
relationships are the means of financial risk management and collateral serves the purpose




operate in highly risky and uncertain environments or a strong competitive energy lead to
support multiple bank relations with the certification effect of external guarantors.
Future research should analyse the mediation role of collateral and external guarantees
on EO – credit access relation. Since the role of guarantees can change based on different
bank lending technologies, further studies should carefully consider lender’s characteristics.
Lastly, the use of loan data in respect of firm data can be helpful to better separate the effect
of the loan and the firm attributes on collateral and other guarantees.
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